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The Role of Brazil and the United States in the
International Promotion of the Right to a Healthy
Environment
José Adércio Leite Sampaio,1 Beatriz Souza Costa2
ABSTRACT: This article has the objective of analyzing the role
played by Brazil and the United States in protecting the right to a
healthy environment at an international level, especially at the World
Trade Organization level. First, we must try to identify the fundamental right to a healthy environment, in its internal dimension and as a
human right, at the international level. We used the bibliographic
technique and deductive methodology to develop the research. The
results at the conclusion evidence that the behavior of political and
economic agents has a direct impact on the level of environmental
protection. In the United States several draft bills were submitted to
change trade laws under the argument that environmental protection
would reduce competitiveness of national goods and services at the
internal and the international levels. In Brazil there was a reduction of
environmental protection, normative, and institutional instruments in
order to stimulate the economy. In both countries however the role of
higher or lower protagonism has also been directly related to the requirements of economic sectors in the country. The supremacy of the
economic interests is the reason why the global international system
and especially WTO have not granted a suitable and effective treatment to the right to a healthy environment.
KEYWORDS: Brazil; United States; Healthy Environment; Global
System for the Protection of Human Rights; WTO; Human Rights.
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I. Introduction
The environment is the world in which we live. A commonplace statement, although appropriate to the consideration that humanity lives in the same space and uses, at least potentially, the same
resources.
Environmental degradation is not a phenomenon that matters
only to one country, one continent, or one terrestrial hemisphere.
That objective connection sends us to an inter-subjectivity necessary
to understand and deal with the problem generated by human activity.
However, that inter-subjectivity comes into conflict with political
borders and economic interests. If states, according to their convenience and demands, tend to regulate the subject as monads, the task is
made for failure. The issue requires other nations and peoples to converge into the bases for sustainable development.
Here is the question asked in this paper: How should environment protection, internal and external systems, relate? This question
demands a previous answer on the status given to environmental protection, its subjectivity as a power or right assigned to all on the
common good of humanity; that is, a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.
This paper defends the environment’s nature of human or fundamental right as the expression of a basic need for individuals;
groups and nations; a plural right; and a multi-subjectivity that requires assistance by a protection regime that meets its indivisible nature. Next we must try to identify the barriers to the interconnection
between the systems regarding both internal and international protection, making it difficult to have the necessary treatment for the indivisibility of phenomena—i.e. global heating; depletion of the ozone
layer; and pollution of the oceans, air, and land. Nevertheless, there
are elements that ease matching the two systems that try to recover
the sense of unity imposed by living on the same planet. We try to
identify the arguments that help in understanding why states resist the
obvious.
The paper also presents an approach about the role played by
Brazil and the United States in both senses—to approximate and to
move environmental protection instruments for national and international systems apart. Those theoretical explanations are tested to reveal what moves one and the other to act both as a part or monad and
as a whole.
27
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II. The Right to a Healthy Environment: A Human Right and a
Fundamental Right3
There are dogmatic and material arguments that support the
definition of the right to a healthy environment or, as the Brazilian
constitutional law states it, ecologically balanced environment—both
as a human right in its international perspective and as a fundamental
right in its internal definition.4 The dogmatic arguments are based on
the existence of several agreements, declarations, covenants, and international treaties that recognize it in general5 and specific6 aspects.
It is also foreseen in constitutions and declared by the constitutional
jurisprudence of several states.7
Material fundamentals are identified by consensus at a state
and international community level. The environment is interpreted as
a moral value that requires due protection by the legal systems.8 That
moral value may be primary, recognizing the environment as a valuable good in itself according to the line defended by the different
trends that form the bio-centric ethics or the so-called “deep ecology;” or it may be a secondary or instrumental value, although legally
and politically essential due to its indispensability for human life on

3.

4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

We are going to use both “right to a healthy environment” and “right to an ecologically balanced environment,” the terminology that is used by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. CONSTITUIÇĀO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
Id.
Refer, for example, to regional instruments of human rights such as the Additional
Protocol to the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the African Letter for the Human Rights and its Additional Protocol
on the Rights of Women. Within the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the Convention on the Rights of Children set forth the right to the highest level
possible of health. Under PIDESC, the right to health includes the obligation to promote environmental health to protect citizens against environmental risks to health to
insure healthy work conditions and secure the right to safe food and drinkable water.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
Among several documents, we list the Convention for the International Trade of Endangered Forest Fauna and Flora Species (CITES), Board Convention on Weather
Changes (UNFCCC), Convention on the Access to Information and Public Participation in the Decision Process and Access to Justice in Environmental Issues (Convention of Aarhus).
CONSTITUIÇĀO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
JOHN BENSON, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH READINGS 1 (2000).
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Earth.9 However, there would be difficulties of a liberal order regarding its categorization especially at a fundamental right level. As a
“collective right” or “community good,” the healthy environment
could not technically be considered a right with a fundamental status.10 Evidence of this is the impossibility that a good belonging to all
could be a protection for the minority as opposed to the majority.
Authors such as Beatriz Costa understand the ecologically balanced environment as a fundamental right due to several aspects
listed in the 1988 Federal Constitution.11 That is the right of all included in Article 5, Item § 2, and also Article 1, Item §3, in which the
dignity of the human being is deeply connected to the healthy environment.12 The author affirms “in Brazil, there is no doubt that the
environment is considered a fundamental right, because any interpretation another way had not found support in the Federal constitution.”13 Those difficulties are confronted by the conclusion that the
harmful effects of environmental disturbance fall especially over
more vulnerable people, including poorer populations, traditional and
native communities, ethnic minorities, women, the elderly and children.14 There would be a social division of the environmental damage
or of the polluted environment.15
In the face of diffuse consequences such as global heating and
the hole in the ozone layer, in the short run, people having higher
purchase power would be able to neutralize them or at least reduce
the harm.16 It is liberal criticism that does not change the nature of
other possible theoretical interpretations such as the communitarian
one, and even some republican trends, that do not deny collective
rights as the characteristic of being fundamental.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

Id. at 119; see also, DAVID R. KELLER, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: THE BIG QUESTION 235
(David R. Keller ed., 2010).
BENSON, supra note 8, at 123.
BEATRIZ SOUZA COSTA, MEIO AMBIENTE COMO DIREITO À VIDA: BRASIL, PORTUGAL &
ESPANHA [ENVIRONMENT AS RIGHT TO LIFE: BRAZIL, PORTUGAL & SPAIN] 60 (2nd ed.
2013).
CONSTITUIÇĀO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 1, 5 (Braz.).
COSTA, supra note 11.
Francis O. Adeola, Cross-National Environmental Injustice and Human Rights Issues
A Review of Evidence in the Developing World, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 686 (2000).
Id. Many studies demonstrate that perverse social division. See also “What Will Happen if Hunger Comes?” Abuses against the Indigenous Peoples of Ethiopia’s Lower
Omo Valley HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Jun. 2012).
Adeola, supra note 14.
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In practice, however, international or not, agencies and governments structure environmental issues at a human and fundamental
right level, each one of them at its own level, or they otherwise do it
superficially or even in a diversionist way. International laws and
regulations are important tools to protect the environment but, in
general, when they address the subject, they tend to concentrate in
technical regulatory aspects as well as in certain ecologic processes.17
At that pace, governments are not able to solve the impacts of environmental disturbance on human rights in a comprehensive way.18
It is important to note that in 2012, the UN’s Council for Human Rights assigned “its first independent expert to develop studies
and reports on compliance with human rights liabilities related to a
safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.”19 Maybe one of its
most important tasks is to help define the content of the human right
to a healthy environment and to define instruments that secure the effective exercise of it.
Despite the difficulties, there is an increasing trend to treat the
environment at a human and constitutional right level. Interconnections concerning that phenomenon are remarkable and expected within nations as well as internationally. Local contexts and even historical circumstances certainly modulate the intensity and the way the
State contributes for that process of international confirmation of the
right to a healthy environment. On the other hand, it goes through international progress and withdrawal influxes. However, the study of
the subject is going to be limited to the United States and Brazil. But
that is a circumscription that may help understand what happens in
other places due to convergences and differences between the two
countries.

17.

18.
19.

An example that is always remembered is the Convention of Stockholm on Persistent
Organic Pollutants. Georg Karlaganis et al., The Elaboration of the ‘Stockholm Convention’ on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs): a Negotiation Process Fraught
with Obstacles and Opportunities, 8(3) ENVTL SCI. & POLLUTION RES. 216 (2001).
Juliane Kippenberg & Jane Cohen, Lives in the Balance: The Human Cost of Environmental Neglect, HUMAN RTS. WATCH 41, 48 (2013).
H.R.C. Res. 19/10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/19/10 (Apr. 19, 2012).

30

The Role of Brazil and the United States

Vol. IV, No. II

III. Interconnections Between Internal and International
Protection to the Right to a Healthy Environment
In a globalized world, it is almost impossible for states to make
environmental policy decisions without taking into account the international scenario and contexts. Technical and economic reasons explain that behavior. In general, the use of stricter instruments for domestic environmental protection raises two major concerns. The first
is on the effectiveness of the measures and the second, the impact
produced on the competitiveness of the country and its companies.20
Thus, the first one is based on the limitation that hinders states
to combat isolated problems such as global heating, air pollution, or
the destruction of the ozone layer.21 The second one relates to the relative increase of operational costs and of the production of goods and
services for companies in states that adopt more restrictive environmental measures.22 They run the risk of seeing their products get
more expensive in the external and internal market and, as a consequence, lose businesses.23
The internal behavior of political and economic agents produce
important effects at an international level.24 Also regulatory measures
and actions adopted by the international community end up producing important consequences domestically, sometimes beyond what is
reasonably predictable.25 Let us give an example by telling a story
that took place in the end of the 1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s.
Over thirty draft bills were submitted to the United States Congress
in order to change trade laws due to complaints that the environmental legislation in force was reducing the competitiveness of the goods
produced in the country.26 The purpose of the drafts was to force other countries to effectively adopt environmental protection standards
that were similar to the North American ones or even the ones inter-

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Mary E. O’Connell, Using Trade to Enforce International Environmental Law: Implications for United States Law, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 273 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahtoranta, The Interest-Based Explanation of International
Environmental Policy, 48(1) INT’L ORG. 77 (1994).
Id. 103-104.
Id.
O’Connell, supra note 20.
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nationally approved.27 The penalty could be the impossibility to access the North American market or the increase of import charges.28
Most of those initiatives failed to progress and some were converted into laws.29 The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)
changed the law for the protection of marine mammals.30 Approved
in 1972, the MMPA impacted fishermen in the country by limiting
the number of dolphins that could be slaughtered annually due to tuna
fishing.31 As a result of the limitation, fishermen complained about
the import of fish from places where such restriction was not in
place.32 With the changes to the MMPA, especially in 1988, fish from
countries that did not adopt restrictive measures were not allowed to
enter the North American territory.33
Under a judicial order, the North American government embargoed the import of tuna captured by Mexican fishermen.34 In the
face of the embargo, Mexico appealed to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to claim a violation.35 The decision was in
Mexico’s favor; therefore, the United States was forced to suspend
the embargo.36 The unilaterally was deemed harmful to free trade,
thus unacceptable, even though correct from the environmental
standpoint.37
The decision guided many other judgments by GATT and its
successor, World Trade Organization (WTO). The convergence of
the humanitarian market reserve and environmental protection produced a series of relevant events for the internal and international environment protection system.38 Some of them were positive, but others were not. The study of the reasons for the convergence between
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Geoffrey W. Levin, The Environment and Trade: A Multilateral Imperative, 1 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 231 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (a preliminary
measure had been granted by a District Court in California in 1990 and it was submitted to an appeal by the North American government.)
Id.
Id.
Mexico etc versus US: “Tuna Dolphin,” WTO (Sep. 3, 1991).
Id.
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normative systems points at multifactorial elements and a higher or a
lower emulative or mimetic tendency or the coercive submission
among them,39 existence of communication and interaction networks,40 and of crossed political and economic pressures.41 Theoretical guidance is added to economic or cultural bias when trying to find
the reason for the behavior of the United States in the creation of an
integrated internal and international system for environmental protection.
However, despite the complexity of the mechanisms that relate
to both protection systems, we are able to notice two kinds of difficulty to obtain institutional isomorphism: the normative one from the
international community, called “centripetal obstacles” and the other
one, resulting from the internal environment of states or, in comparison, called “centrifugal obstacles.” There is an important counterpositioning element against the forces that dissipate the encounter between the two systems: the civil society and the internal, transfrontier that mobilizes cooperation and makes both act as multidirectional facilitators.
a. Centripetal Difficult Forces
At the international level, the right to a healthy environment is
subject to the vicissitudes of a non-systematic treatment of international human rights, international protection system, and economic
logic within the WTO.
i. The Right to a Healthy Environment Within the International Law
for Human Rights
The global system for the protection of rights has not given the
appropriate treatment to the right to a healthy environment. It certainly has difficulties, but when it consistently fails to include environmental protection in its agenda, it ends up by reducing itself. Environmental problems reflect on several aspects to human life, from
liberty to equality and health to education. Even if regulations are not
39.
40.
41.

PAUL J. DIMAGGIO & WALTER W. POWELL, NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds. 1991).
Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 171 (2004).
George Hoberg, Globalization and Policy Convergence: Symposium Overview, 3 J.
COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS: RES.& PRAC. 127 (2001).
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seen as proper law, an assessment of the nuclear elements is necessary.
People who live in an environmentally disturbed area are not
duly respected in regards to their dignity. The inaccurate treatment
that is given to the subject reflects the low systematic number of approved international agreements and treaties. Areas that are both
blank and overlapped generate a loss of normative content and efficiency. The complexity of the subject already creates obstacles to setting conceptual units and the lack of normative syntonic creates more
difficulties. The multiplicity of international documents results in additional costs for state administration, not only because they require
extra internal coordination work, but also because they require follow
up actions and negotiations within international and regional organisms.
The fragmented treatment currently given to those problems
only postpones the inevitable consideration of the environment as a
true human right. The wasted time may result in additional costs. It is
more than time that the international law for human rights takes over
the task of defining the content and the structure of the right to a
healthy environment, reinforcing its institution by means of mechanisms aimed at people, groups, or states that, for action or omission,
start environmental crises.42 While the international law for human
rights fails in that mission, environmental protection at a global level
is subject to the changes and desires of economy revealed by the experience of GATT and its successor, WTO.
ii. The Right to a Healthy Environment Within the World Trade
Organization.
Efforts led by the United States to rebuild commercial ties between nations after the Second World War resulted in the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).43 That agreement established a set of standards to reduce tariff barriers to trade at a global
level.44

42.
43.
44.

Kippenberg & Cohen, supra note 18.
Id.
Id.
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In that document, the environment was only mentioned in Article 20 of GATT as an exception to free trade rules.45 According to
the article, countries are able to create measures “necessary to protect
human, animal or vegetal life and health” or “related to the conservation of non-renewable natural resources” because those measures do
not correspond to unfair discrimination against foreign products or
operate in a restrictive and dissimulated way over trade.46
We notice that the interest was little and the subject was in
standby until the 1970s, when it effectively became part of GATT’s
concerns, especially with the creation of the Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade (EMIT Group), with the document
called “Control of Industrial Pollution and International Trade” and
the debates and results of the Tokyo Round of commercial negotiations (1973-1979).47 However, the concern was not exactly environmental protection, but the negative impacts of protection measures
adopted by states on international trade. Exceptions to Article 20
should be duly treated to avoid becoming rules.48
Another sign of that preference, trade over the environment,
can be identified in the decisions made when solving conflicts between countries. The case of the dolphins between the United States
and Mexico sets the pace of the preference.49 According to the group
that decided it, exceptions to trade foreseen in Article 20 should be
interpreted restrictively.50 In addition, the United States had not evidenced that the prohibition to import tuna was “necessary;” it was the
less restrictive way for trade to protect dolphins.51
The United States could have obtained the same objective
through agreements with other countries. Finally, North Americans
could not use the exceptions in Article 20 to regulate natural resources outside the borders of the country. To summarize, the United
States had used an unjustified discriminatory measure against Mexi45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WTO (2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Rules].
Id.
Early Years: Emerging Environment Debate in GATT/WTO, WTO (2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm.
WTO Rules, supra note 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cans. The conclusion could have been different if environmental protection was a priority or, at least placed at the same level of trade
promotion.52
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in January
1995 as one of the main measures of the last round of GATT carried
out in Uruguay between 1986 and 1994.53 The WTO was established
as a permanent organization and it maintained most of GATT’s principles.54 It has its own legal personality with member states and customs unions integrated in.55 Institutionalism and permanence make
the WTO different from its predecessor. Objectives were also added
to include the trade of goods, the trade of services, and the protection
of industrial property.56 The environment was expressly mentioned in
the introduction of WTO’s Institutive as one of the Parties’ consideranda.57 The economic activity would have to take place through the
“optimal use of global resources according to the objective of sustainable development and trying to protect and preserve the environment.”58
Among the agencies that form the structure of the WTO is the
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), which aims at conciliating trade demands and environment protection to allow for the

52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

R. Kenton Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT-Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957 (1993). According to the panel: “The Panel considered that if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States
were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would
then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number
of contracting parties with identical internal regulations.” Id.
Who We Are, WTO (2016),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm.
Id.
Id.
What Are Intellectual Property Rights?, WTO (2016),
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm.
The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO (2016),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.
Agreement Establishing the WTO, WTO AGREEMENT SERIES 1 (2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries1_wto_e.pdf.
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promotion of sustainable development.59 Since the creation of the
WTO, eight Ministerial Conferences have occurred: Singapore in
1996; Geneva in 1998; Seattle in 1999; Doha in 2001; Cancun in
2003; Hong Kong in 2005; Geneva in 2009-2011; and Bali in 2013.60
However, the CTE’s recommendations have not led to any relevant
changes regarding the multilateral trade system in what touches the
environment, although they have been considered.61 In the first Conference, the commitment to the sustainable use of natural resources
and to clean economic development was reaffirmed.62 At the same
time, the cooperation between intergovernmental environmental organizations such as the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP) was stimulated.63
However, negotiation rounds that followed it only rhetorically
claimed that the promotion of global trade was compatible with the
requirements of sustainable development. The practical results were
unsatisfactory. The evidence shows that, although stimulated by the
WTO, multilateral agreements concerning the environment still fail
to receive normative treatment within the WTO. These results are not
part of Attachment I to the Agreement that created it, and although
they could be included into its legal order through the application of
Article 5 of the Agreement, the members have not officially addressed the inclusion of these results.64
That deficit of normativity reflects on the cases that were assessed via WTO litigation, and the fundament of the decision rarely
59.

60.

61.
62.
63.

64.

The Committee on Trade and Environment (‘regular’ CTE), WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm (last visited Mar.
3, 2016).
Ministerial Conferences, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2016). The Ministerial Conference, integrated by the members of WTO, is the body
that makes the most important decisions within the Organization, including subjects in
any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
See generally LENORE SEK, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES (2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57791.pdf.
Id. at 6.
The WTO and United Nations Environment Programme, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_unep_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2016).
See HENRIK HORN, PETROS V. MAVROIDIS, & ANDRÉ SAPIR, BEYOND THE WTO? AN
ANATOMY OF EU AND US PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 3-7 (Andrew Fielding ed.,
2009), http://goo.gl/e6EenU.
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resorts to one of those agreements.65 As illustrated above, environmental protection is interpreted by Article 20 of GATT as an exception to free trade.66 The legal dispute between the United States and
Mexico concerning tuna showed how the nature of that exception attracts restrictive interpretation, to the detriment of the environment.
That guidance has not changed even after WTO committed itself to
the environmental cause.
Very recently, the subject was revisited after Mexico raised a
new claim against the United States. This new claim was raised to
check compliance with the North American requirement that packages of tuna sold in the country were properly labeled to state the tuna
was fished without posing risks to dolphins.67 The panel understood
that the required labeling was more restrictive to trade than necessary
to meet the legitimate objectives of (i) making sure that consumers
were not deceived or deluded about dolphin slaughter due to tuna
fishing; and (ii) contributing to protect the dolphins, making sure that
the North American market is not used to incentivize fishing fleets
capture tuna and threaten the life of dolphins.68 This idea has been reiterated since the WTO’s first decisions.
In Venezuela, Brazil v. United States, the complaint was supported by a regulation approved by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives
founded on the 1990 Clean Air Act that set forth base toxicity levels
for imported gasoline.69 Refineries in the country were in charge of
establishing those toxicity levels, which would in practice result in a
differentiated and more onerous treatment in regards to the external
product, as compared to the internal one.

65.
66.

67.

68.
69.

See id. at 20-23.
See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT, ARTICLE XX –
GENERAL EXCEPTIONS 562-97 (n.d.),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art20_e.pdf.
United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm (last visited Mar.
3, 2016).
Id.
Venezuela, Brazil versus US: gasoline, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis07_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
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In that case, Article III § 4 issued by GATT-94 would have
been violated.70 The United States responded, arguing that the measure was necessary in order to reduce the emissions in the atmosphere
of toxic substances resulting from gasoline combustion.71 Nevertheless, the WTO decided in favor of the plaintiffs.72 The North Americans had not proven that the environmental exception imposed was
the least restrictive possible means to facilitate trade.73 Also, unjustified discrimination had been promoted between the national and the
imported product. According to the WTO, the measure created a disguised and unjustifiable restriction to the international trade under the
excuse of promoting the environment.74
However, the outlook is not entirely grim. In another case that
was evaluated by the WTO, the United States was questioned by various countries, including Malaysia and Thailand, because the United
States’ legislation, among other restrictions, forbids the sale of
shrimp captured by nets that would not allow for marine turtles to escape from them.75 For the United States, the requirement was a necessary instrument for the protection of marine turtles, which were on
the list of endangered species issued by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES).76 For the plaintiffs, it was a unilateral measure against
GATT.77 However, the WTO had a different understanding of the situation; unilaterally, it was not considered reason enough to say that
the impugned measure is inconsistent with GATT, and the WTO did
not find unjustified discrimination had occurred.78 Additionally, distinguished from the Dolphin-Tuna Case I, it was allowed to restrict
import based on its production process, instead of restricting import
based on the product itself.79 Furthermore, the WTO used a multilateral agreement that defended the environment, which rarely happens.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 10, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996)..
See generally id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 14.
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In a later dispute, the European Union sued Brazil because
Brazilian laws forbid the import of used and refurbished tires.80 However, this prohibition did not apply against the countries in the Mercosur.81 Brazil claimed to be protecting the environment, and justified
the exception by asserting that the imports from the Mercosur only
compromised a small percentage of total imports into Brazil.82 The
WTO recognized that the prohibition against the import of used or refurbished tires was justifiable due to the protection of the environment, as well as public health and safety.83 However, the exception
was not accepted once it was considered unjustifiable discrimination.84
Regardless, it would be premature to say that the WTO has
surrendered to the evidence of the environmental problem. Economic
and pragmatic interests still prevail over the need to protect the environment. The limited number of cases decided in favor of the ecological issues, the lack of normativity within the WTO, and the lack of
international treaties and conventions on the subject are still reasons
for pessimistic conclusions which, in face of the Doha Round—
where an approximation between WTO’s agreements and the agreements of other international organisms was tested with an environmental objective—still have no prospect of reversal.85
At the very least, the little dialogue between those organisms is
a problem when obtaining reasonable levels of environmental protection. It is a greater problem when recognizing the right to a healthy
environment. Approximation initiatives between the WTO, regional
agencies, and the United Nations for Human Rights are still shy when

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 1,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id.
See generally Sabrina Shaw, Trade and Environment in WTO, in TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICT OR COMPATIBILITY? 5.1 (Duncan Brack ed., Routledge
2013); HENRIK HORN ET AL., BEYOND THE WTO? AN ANATOMY OF EU AND US
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 47 (2009); see also CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF
DISPUTES CASES, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (discussing World Trade Organization cases that involve
environmental issues).
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we think about the challenges ahead. Without understating, it is a
matter of survival.
iii. The Hindering Centrifugal Forces
The countries pose difficulty in achieving international protection for the right to a healthy environment. Economic and geopolitical interests tend to guide the external politics of each country, interfering with the guidance adopted in international forums. Thus,
peculiarities of the legal and political systems of the states may solidify the adoption of environmental standards and parameters they
agree to follow. The diversity of maturity stages regarding legal institutions, associated to political cultures, may delay or even hinder the
harmonization of the protection mechanisms. The subject would certainly require more detail, but the aim of this article is to assist relations between the Federal government and subnational entities, and
between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial branches, as
they define and carry out environmental public policies. Another element that may interfere in the process is the recognition of a fundamental right to a healthy environment. The Constitution is a key element to establishing or, at least, canalizing the forces that work on the
interrelation between the internal system and the international system
for the protection of the environment.
iv. Environmental Federalism
In both the United States and Brazil, federal and state efforts to
protect the environment are cooperative in nature, which is a positive
element for the committal of internationally agreed engagements.86
Nevertheless, conflicts are not rare. In the United States, the increasing federal regulation on the issue is subject to severe criticism, especially from state authorities. For example, there has been controversy
between the federal and state control over the extraction of schist
oil.87 The states claimed exclusive attribution on the subject and
strongly protested against the intention of making it federal.88
86.
87.

88.

See generally Roberton C. Williams III, Growing State-Federal Conflicts in Environmental Policy: The Role of Market-Based Regulation, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1092 (2012).
Albert C. Lin, Fracking and Federalism: A Comparative Approach to Reconciling National and Subnational Interests in the United States and Spain, 44 ENVTL. L. 1039
(2014).
Id.
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In general, it is said that the hypertrophy of the federal government hinders the suitable and efficient management of environmental policies by the states and local powers. The centralization of
the environmental policy does not hinder the state competence, since
the complementary standards set forth stricter protection standards.89
Concerning recent state complaints, articulation and incentive formulas have been used so that state legislations follow the federal model,
especially in those fields in which the trade clause is not involved.90
Environmental executive federalism has been criticized due to
the expenses it generates for subnational bodies. Between 2000 and
2010, state cashboxes were burdened by at least $23 billion US dollars due to the main regulations adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during that period.91 The Supreme Court has
been called to give an opinion about possible centralizing excesses by
the federal government but it generally has maintained an approval of
the federal standard.92
Brazil’s legal system is facing similar controversy. The constitution tasks all federal bodies to promote a healthy environment.93
Legislative environmental competence is also shared.94 The federal
government is in charge of deciding general standards, where states
and cities, when appropriate, have the complementary competence.95
Competence is significantly reduced once the constitution privately assigns the federal government authority concerning civil,
trade, and procedural law, etc.96 That is why many state laws, some
stricter than the federal laws, have been declared unconstitutional by
the supreme federal court. For example, the Court “prohibited the use

89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.
95.
96.

Williams III, supra note 86.
Id.
WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 42 (2014).
Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41(4) ADMIN. L. REV. 549
(1989); Joseph F. Zimmermann, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE
GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER 83 et seq. (2008).
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 220 (Braz.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of products, materials or artifacts that contain any type of asbestos in
the state of São Paulo.”97
However, that centralizing trend in the field of material competences has been seriously reduced through federal laws that forward
execution, including environmental permitting processes, to the states
and cities. The competence transferring or returning process is not
always followed by the allocation of resources, which has generated
strong criticism against local governments. For environmentalist sectors, executive decentralization may increase the effectiveness of environmental standards, both the ones foreseen in the domestic legislation and the ones taken over externally. Due to that fact, it is said that
decentralization has been taking place in a disorderly manner, without any planning or articulation regarding the three spheres of government. The picture is further aggravated when we consider the significant differences between the normative and the administrative
systems of the several federative agencies, some of which lack the
structure to carry out the task, in addition to being easier for the decision process to be coopted by the economic power.
The dependence of the legislature is another element that creates difficulty of making commitments to agreements already adopted
and promotes changes regarding the external policies on the subject.
In Brazil, an environmental treaty or agreement depends on approval
by the National Congress to be part of the internal legal order, as in
the United States.98 Aside from that, there is always the possibility
that the Legislature approves laws that deviate from international
standards for the protection of the environment, even for worse. The
internal hierarchy of treaties may aggravate that picture. In case there
is no hierarchy, the later law revokes provisions in a treaty that integrates the legal order. The subject is delicate in the United States because of popular sovereignty.99
In Brazil the situation is less complicated. Human rights treaties have a supra legal position in case they are not incorporated as a

97.
98.
99.

R.S.T.F.-SP, ADI 3937, Realtor: Min. Marco Aurelio, 4.6.2008, 103, DIÁRIO DA
JUSTIÇA [D.J.], 16.6.2008 (Braz.).
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 49 (Braz.).
Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
(1986); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310 (1992).
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constitutional amendment, preventing laws to revoke them.100 The
issue is knowing what discipline on the environment integrates the
right to a healthy or ecologically balanced environment, and thus,
what is placed outside the legislative provision and only reports to
merely administrative tasks that could, in theory, be changed. The use
of the social environmental non-retroactivity principle, which, in its
most requiring perspective, prevents changes that directly or indirectly aggravate the environmental protection system is increasing in the
country, especially within the doctrine.101 However, it is not universal
insurance against legislative changes, especially in economic crisis
periods.
Even if express constitutional recognition of the right to a
healthy or ecologically balanced environment tends to reduce argumentative requirements for the approval of measures aimed at protecting ecologic processes, it is necessary to consider and to promote
sustainable development. There is no device on that purpose in the
United States and not even recognition by means of interpretative
construction by the Supreme Court, and as a consequence, it is not a
constitutional right. In Brazil, Article 225 of the 1988 Federal Constitution states:
“All have the right to an ecologically balanced environment, a
common use good and essential for a healthy quality of life. The Public Power and the collectivity have the obligation to defend and preserve it for the present and future generations.”102
It is certainly an important legal contribution to stimulate governors to take over external commitments for the protection of the
environment, as well as to facilitate for its possible integration to the
domestic order. Politics, however, is not always limited to the law.
v. Multi-Dimensional Facilitating Forces
Environmental law and policies tend to progress when the civil
society is involved, and at the same time, when states agree to collaborate more than compete.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
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vi. The Participation of the Civil Society
Entrusting the destiny of humanity to institutionalized representatives of the state power is not a guarantee that an efficient international environment protection system is going to be used. Besides
the critical elements of the popular representation mechanism itself,
economic and geopolitical interests end up interfering in deliberative
processes. Discovering the civil society as an indispensable instrument is not only beneficial for democratic legitimation, but also for
the control and effectiveness of the execution of public policies, in
which liberals and republicans agree.103 The phenomenon is not only
restricted to states, it is internationally expressed.104
The progress of communication that technology allows for the
creation of forums, discussion, and articulation networks on many
subjects, including environmental ones, makes it easier to spread the
information and to organize events at the same time everywhere on
the planet, to have a common agenda for claims, and to strengthen
globalized environmental movements.105 In earlier times, non-formal
spaces were defended to spread collective ideas and projects to counter-arrest the corporatism of national parliaments. With democratic
gains, we can now say the same to the international community in the
face of multi-lateral organisms and multi-national companies.106
That stimulus to social participation can be reinforced by the
constitutions of the countries. In Brazil, the constitutional text creates
real social participation and right promotion tasks, for example, the
ones having a social bias such as health and education, as well as a
collective bias such as the right to an ecologically balanced environment.107 It also assigns power for the citizen to petition, represent, and
control acts performed by public agents and also to impugn them judicially through a civil suit for the violation of environmental protec-

103. David J. Frank, The Social Bases of Environmental Treaty Ratification, 1900-1990,
69(4) SOC. INQUIRY 523 (1999).
104. Id.
105. Bart Cammaerts, Lógicas de protesto e a estrutura de oportunidade de mediação, 7(2)
MATRIZES, 13 (2013); Francis L.F. Lee, Internet, Citizen Self-Mobilisation, and Social
Movement Organisations in Environmental Collective Action Campaigns: Two Hong
Kong Cases, ENVTL. POL. 308 (2014).
106. Lee, supra note 105, at 309-10.
107. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 6, 252 (Braz.).
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tion obligations.108 The United States Constitution also stimulates the
participation of individuals and groups in the deliberative processes
of the country. That happens, not expressly, but by recognizing the
freedom of speech and of press, the freedom of association and assembly, and the right to petition associated with a culture of vindication and defense of what de Tocqueville called “well understood interest.”109
It is right that those participation loci are also available for occupation by the defects of formal deliberative processes and the explanation is not a complex one. Different interests of both a moral
and altruistic nature, and an economic and egotistic aspect intersect in
the exercise of participative competences. Environmental policy formulators cannot disregard that plurality of voices, which results in
reduced expectations regarding original projects and plans. Instead of
having a technically ideal solution for problems, we end up obtaining
a hybrid product of arrangements, commitments, and various consensuses from the different actors and interests involved.110
The environment of dialogue and conflagration has caused environmentalists to adopt negotiation strategies with some pragmatism, so as to get the more beneficial alternative, even if it is not ideal, for environmental preservation.111 To abandon the table of
negotiations would be a formula for failure for the intended policy;
however, to stay in it is a sign of the agony of the idealized policy.112
That happens not only in the legislative process (for example,
the current Brazilian Forest Code, Law 12.651/2012), but also along
the execution of the laws. This is more visible in the center of environmental public hearings so much that, most of the time, it reduces,
108. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.).
109. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, A DEMOCRACIA NA AMÉRICA 148-49 (2000).
110. See GRAHAM ALLISON, THE ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 144-45 (1971).
111. CHARLES A. LINDBLOM & EDWARD J. WOODHOUSE, THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS
(1993); James G. Speth, Environmental Failure: A Case for the New Green Politics,
ENVIRONMENT360 (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/environmental_failure_a_case_for_a_new_green_politics/
2075/.
112. CHARLES A. LINDBLOM & EDWARD J. WOODHOUSE, THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS
(1993); James G. Speth, Environmental Failure: A Case for the New Green Politics,
ENVIRONMENT360 (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/environmental_failure_a_case_for_a_new_green_politics/
2075/.
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but does not prevent environmental damages due to projects that from
the strict standpoint of environmental protection should not receive a
permit.113 Even with that bias of pragmatism, social movements are
indispensable for the promotion of internal and international environment protection policies. Difficulties and deviations faced from
that movement tend to be overcome by education provided by the deliberative process itself. The union of environment and democracy is
the hope for a better world.
vii. International Cooperation
Environmental problems concerned with the reduction of the
ozone layer and loss of biodiversity are the result of human action
and its impacts can also be felt all over the world; fighting or managing it depends on the cooperation of all countries. Deficits of dialogue
between international environment protection agencies clash with the
effectiveness of its regulations and policies, making the economic
logic prevail over eco-protection needs.
Economic theory and practice teach that, in the absence of cooperation, each country and each economic agent tends to maximize
his own net benefits of cost reduction by using environmental policies.114 By doing so, they stimulate international competition that has
deleterious consequences for the environment.115 Several studies indicate that the lack of natural resources and environmental disturbance
may be reasons for conflicts and even wars, and may also contribute
to stimulating the cooperation between countries.116 The more cooperation that occurs, the higher the damage and the lower the resource

113. LCSAR, Brazil Land Governance Assessment 77 (Mar. 2014),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLGA/Resources/Brazil_Final_Report.pdf.
114. Scott Barrett, The Problem of Global Environmental Protection, 6(1) OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 68 (1990); ROBERT EB LUCAS ET AL., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF TOXIC
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION,1960-88 (1992).
115. Scott Barrett, The Problem of Global Environmental Protection, 6(1) OXFORD REV. OF
ECON. POL’Y 68 (1990); ROBERT EB LUCAS ET AL., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF TOXIC
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION,1960-88 (1992).
116. See, e.g., Henry Fountain, Researchers Link Syrian Conflict to a Drought Made Worse
by Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/science/earth/study-links-syria-conflict-todrought-caused-by-climate-change.html?_r=0.
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availability.117 There is still the variable imposed by the higher or
lower return given by those resources so profitable that raw inputs
tend to stimulate cooperative attitudes to stabilize markets and prices.118
There is also an ingredient added by the diversity of political
and normative systems and structures between the countries that have
already been addressed above.119 Those economic and institutional
readings require a complement that is supplied by a culture of human
coexistence that is not only based on the homo economicus.120 Motivations of human actions and, inductively, of states, can be due to
other reasons such as moral and political ones.121
Regardless of the direction one may follow, it is agreed that the
cooperation fomented by international organisms shall take place
through equalitarian bases, always considering the existing differences regarding the economic and social development between countries. The asymmetries have to be taken into account to coordinate the
actions of international players. Adopting the hegemonic positions of
more developed states ends up by making agreements or their effectiveness impossible.122
The paralysis of WTO in the Doha round is an example. One
cannot forget that it is healthy to include the private sector in that
scenario, since its economic interests do not overlap the purpose of
protection and the voice of the countries under development. The use
117. Shlomi Dinar, Resource Scarcity and Environmental Degradation, Analyzing International Conflicts and Cooperation, BEYOND RESOURCE WARS: SCARCITY, ENVTL.
DEGRADATION, & INT’L COOPERATION 26 (Shlomi Dinar ed., 2011).
118. Helge Hveem, Minerals as a Factor in a Strategic Policy and Action, in GLOBAL
RESOURCES & INT’L CONFLICT 73 (Arthur H. Westing ed., Oxford University Press
1986).
119. Brett A. Leeds, Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation, 43(4) AM. J. POL. SCI. 979 (1999).
120. Dirk Helbing, Economics 2.0: The Natural Step Towards A Self-Regulating, Participatory Market Society, 10(1) EVOL. INST. ECON. REV. 2 (June 2013),
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.4078v2.pdf.
121. John Meyer et al., The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870-1990, 51
INT’L ORG. 623 (1997); David J. Frank, The Social Bases of Environmental Treaty
Ratification, 1900-1990, 69(4) SOC. INQUIRY 523 (1999).
122. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY; NEGOTIATING MORE EFFECTIVE
GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 18 (1994); see also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Sharing of International Environmental Law, 93(3)
AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 603-604 (1999).
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of certifications from “businesses friend of environment” through an
expedient such as ISO 14000 tends to contribute to the process, since
it does not mean a privatization of the protection parameters themselves at the expense of the deliberative power of the states, especially the poorer ones, and the claims of the globalized civil society.123
The international cooperation is cause-and-effect, as one can
notice, in terms of the approximation of the internal and international
systems to protect the right to a healthy environment.
IV. The Role of the United States and Brazil in the International
Protection of Environmental and Human Rights
The protagonism of the United States in the international policy of human rights and the defense of the environment is the foreseen
result of its condition of economic, military, and cultural power.
Brazil has played the international role of hosting large conferences; however, when applying the existing legislation in favor of
environmental protection, it also collides with economic interests.
a. The United States and International Protection of Human
and Environmental Rights
At the end of the 1960’s and beginning of the 1970’s, the United States led the efforts for international agreements and treaties on
the environment to be signed.124 Treaties such as the 1972 Convention of London on ocean dumping, the 1972 Convention on World
Heritage, the 1973 Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species, and the 1978 MARPOL Protocol on the Pollution by
Ships were the direct products of that effort.125
However, the work of the United States is mostly guided by its
strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests, resulting in some contradictory actions. The protagonism it adopted during that time, for
most of the literature, was a result of the need to induce the other
123. Jennifer Clapp, The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000
and the Developing World, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 295 (1998); see also David J.
Frank, The Social Bases of Environmental Treaty Ratification, 1900-1990, 69(4) SOC.
INQUIRY 523 (1999).
124. Daniel Kelemen & David Vogel, Trading Places: The Role of the United States and
the European Union in International Environmental Politics, 20(10) COMP. POL. STUD.
1 (2009).
125. Id. at 2.
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countries to adopt the strict and expensive environmental legislation
that, due to internal movements, it had approved.126 The concern was
more to equalize the cost of its products in the market than to convince others of the social, economic, and even ethical problem that
the environmental issue raised.127 There were also explanations for
the withdrawal promoted by the country to ratify multilateral agreements, especially on the environment, after the end of the Cold War.
For example, the United States failed to ratify the 1989 Basel
Convention on the Disposal of Hazardous Waste, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1991 Kyoto Protocol on Weather
Changes, the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the 2001
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.128 The United States’ main concern is the defense of the internal interests of its
producers and convincing commercial partners through unilateral
sanctions.129 The almost unconditional support to multilateral adjustment for the liberalization of trade such as WTO and NAFTA is an
exception.130
It is clear that the external North American politics assumes
the promotion of Human Rights, in general, and of the quality of the
environment as one of its main objectives.131 However, the words and
intentions declared do not always result in the attitudes and initiatives
taken.
On that regard, the contradiction is evident due to the nonratification of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights and
the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Tribunal.132
In what concerns international environmental law, refusing to sign
the Kyoto Protocol and the objective of questioning the scientific bases of the relationship between global heating and the emission of
gases, especially C02, goes beyond a legitimate exercise of doubting

126. Harold Jacobson, Climate Change, Unilateralism, Realism and Two-Level Games, in
MULTILATERALISM & U.S. FOREIGN POL’Y 415 (Shepard Forman, Lynne Rienner, &
Patrick Stewart eds. 2002).
127. Id.
128. Kelemen & Vogel, supra note 124, at 2.
129. Id. at 20.
130. CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF
GOOD INTENTIONS 228 (2003).
131. Id. at 229.
132. Kelemen & Vogel, supra note 124, at 9.
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the fashionable scientific certainties.133 The United States may find
reasons, for example, in the interest of the country to keep growing at
higher rates than Europeans and in preventing competition from
countries such as China that were not linked to gas reduction targets.134 Something similar happened with the non-ratification of the
Cartagena Protocol.135 The Cartagena Protocol dealt with farmers and
the biotechnology industry in the country, with the use of genetically
modified organisms, and whether they would be harshly impacted
with the restrictions imposed by the trade.136
The problems of geopolitics and economic interests explain
most of that withdrawal. We cannot forget that part of the international legislation for human rights is a direct or indirect consequence
of North American efforts before the different bodies in the international community, and that those efforts were during the time they
were away from the subject. Thus, the country plays an important
role in the mobilization of the United Nations Human Rights Council
to respond to flagrant violations to human rights in different parts of
the world.137 The country has signed several regional and international treaties that have the purpose of protecting human rights and the
environment.138
For many, the increasing involvement of the United States in
order to protect the global environment demonstrates the progressive
awareness of citizens and leaders regarding not only the severity and
the importance of the problem, but also moral and economic awareness.139
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is worth adding to the analysis regarding cooperation and the use of native and

133. Jon Hovi et al., Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol:
German, Norwegian and US perspectives, EUR. J. INT’L REL. 2 (2010); see also Louis
A. DiLeo, The Polar Bear Ethic: From the Reactionary Trend in Environmental Lawmaking to the Climate Change Imperative, 28 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 347 (2013).
134. Kelemen & Vogel, supra note 124, at 21-22.
135. Id. at 20.
136. Miranda Schreurs, Global Environment Threats in a Divided Northern Community, 5
INT’L ENVTL AGREEMENTS 349, 349 (2005).
137. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2014 654 (2014) [hereinafter WORLD REPORT
2014].
138. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013 207 (2013) [hereinafter WORLD REPORT
2013].
139. ROSENBAUM, supra note 91, at 8.
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traditional technologies among contracting parties. M. Visentin
teaches when he mentions the Convention:
Each Contracting Party has to adopt legislative, administrative or
political measures, as the case may be, to allow for effective participation in biotechnological research activities of all [p]arts, especially
[c]ountries under development that provide the research with genetic
resources and, if possible, within the territory of those Contracting
Parties.140
It is important to remember that the CDB, launched in Brazil at
ECO-92, was not ratified by the United States at that time.141 Ratification only happened one year after the Convention. Brazil, a member of the CDB, has surprisingly not ratified the Nagoya Protocol, in
force since October 2014,that sets forth the rules for the fair and equitable partition among member countries of benefits from the use of
genetic resources.142 It is a subject that is clearly favorable to human
rights. The delay to ratify is due to the great potential of supplying
genetic resources, which has to be well structured.
b. Brazil and the International Protection of Human and
Environmental Rights
Brazil’s priority role is played at a regional level,143 although it
had decided to be more active at a global level, especially in the first
140. M. Alice Dias Rolim Visentin, Acesso ao Recursos Genéticos, repartição de
Benefícios e propriedade intelectual: A conservação da Biodiversidade e os direitos
de patentes [Access to genetic resources, sharing of benefits and intellectual property:
Conservation of Biodiversity and patent rights], 17 (9) REVISTA VEREDAS DO DIREITO
163, 168 (2012).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Mercosul - Tribunal Permanente de Revisão, Laudo n. 1/2005. (Brazil worked to include the “environmental exception” for the Common Market of the South. Article 2,
b, in Attachment I of the Assumption Treaty refers to the provision in article 50 of the
1980 Montevideo Treaty that says, “Art. 50. No provision in this Treaty shall be interpreted as a hindrance to the adoption and compliance of measures for: d) the protection of the life and health of people, animals and vegetal.” The Permanent Review Tribunal, court of Mercosur for the solution of controversies between its members, started
to apply the principle of proportionality to assess, in the concrete case, the possible use
of exception. It also worked to create the Work Subgroup n. 6 on Environment, which
tries to promote the integration between trade and environment. The same can be said
regarding the approval of the Board Agreement on Environment of Mercosur, which
stated the principles of the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro on Environment and Development in 1992). Id.
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ten years of this century.144 That role and protagonism are also
marked by actions that are not always coherent with the defense of
human and environmental rights. In the United Nations Human
Rights Council, with a representation between 2010 and 2011 as well
as between 2013 and 2014, Brazil has voted in favor of the resolutions that addressed critical situations in several countries such as
Belarus, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sri-Lanka, and Sudan.145 At the
General Assembly of the United Nations, still in the first two years,
the country voted in favor of two resolutions that condemned the violence of the State of Syria.146 Also in that year, during the Universal
Periodical Review at Human Rights Council, the country accepted
159 out of the 170 recommendations, agreeing to adopt measures to
fight torture and improve the conditions of prisons and of public safety.147
However, the new period at the Council was a step backwards
and that behavior was repeated within the General Assembly. In
2013, for example, Brazil abstained from voting for a resolution that
condemned the violence in Syria, recognizing the Syrian opposition,
the National Coalition, as “an efficient speaker for a political transition;” Brazil did the same for the resolution concerning violations to
human rights in Iran, such as torture and public executions.148 At the
end of that year, Brazil seemed to have the former positive attitudes
when it supported a resolution that demanded all parts of Syria to
stop violations and abuses to human rights and to international humanitarian law.149 Its relative alignment with countries such as Russia
and China, especially within BRIC, tend to slow down a more consistent external policy for the protection of the rights.150
Especially on the environmental field, its work was praised at
Rio 92 (Section II Conference of the United Nations on Environment
and Human Development) for defending international cooperation for
the promotion of fair and sustainable development in the course of a
144. Peter Dauvergne & Déborah Farias, The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power, 33 THIRD WORLD Q. 5, 903 (2012).
145. Id.
146. Visentin, supra note 140.
147. Id.
148. WORLD REPORT 2014, supra note 137, at 222-23.
149. Id.; WORLD REPORT 2013, supra note 138, at 207-08.
150. Amado L. Cervo, Brazil in the Current World Order, 1(2) AUSTRAL: BRAZILIAN J.
STRATEGY & INT’L REL. 35, 40 (2012).
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positive agenda, Agenda 21.151 At Rio 20, it promoted the adoption
of the Objectives of Sustainable Development and of a new global
indicator, the Inclusive Wealth Report (IWR).152 Brazil also contributed to the creation of the C-40: groups of cities worldwide, including
Curitiba, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, with common objectives of
adopting sustainable urban policies.153
Economic interests associated to strategic positions led to
withdrawals or partial defenses of the environment in the global and
regional scenarios, similarly to the human rights in general. A picture
of that scenario may be found in the behavior of the country in face
of the concession of preventive measures by the Inter American
Commission for Human Rights, when the groups of native people
impacted by the project were listened to in order to suspend the construction of the Belo Monte power plant.154 The answer was truculent,
not only when it classified the conclusions of the Commission as
“premature and unjustified,” but also when it withdrew its ambassador at the Organization of American States.155 After that, it proposed
changes to the inter-American system of human rights that included
the reduction of the power of the Commission to issue preventive
measures.156
The implementation of the commitments taken over externally,
including the ones of which it was one of the promoters, still needs to
be improved. Lack of priority of government planning and continuity,
allied with the weak participation of the civil society, explains the
low execution effectiveness regarding environmental objectives and
targets the country agreed to accomplish. An example can be found in
the implementation of the Agenda 21 by the cities. Information on the
environment from IBGE’s “Research Profile of Brazilian Cities” indicates that from the Agenda 21 that existed in 2002, only 20% were
151. JOSE GOLDENBERG, NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO
CONVENTION, 155-57 (Bo Kellén et al. eds.,1994).
152. Id.
153. ANDRÉ A. C. LAGO, ESTOCOLMO, RIO, JOANESBURGO: O BRASIL E A TRÊS
CONFERÊNCIAS AMBIENTAIS DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS (2007); see also Clitia Helena B.
Martins et al., Da Rio-92 à Rio+ 20: Avanços e Retrocessos da Agenda 21 no Brasil
[Rio- 92 to Rio + 20: Progress and Setbacks of Agenda 21 in Brazil], 42(3)
INDICADORES ECONÔMICOS FEE 97 (2015).
154. WORLD REPORT 2013, supra note 138, at 207.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 206.
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still in force, although not forcibly effective by 2012.157 The other
ones had simply been forgotten.158
Large projects such as the transposition of São Francisco River
or the construction of Belo Monte, and the organization of mega
events in the country such as the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, Rodrigo and Carlos José call attention
to the following:
Associated to the interest of agro business and mining companies, mobilized government forces to mitigate the environmental
rules, promote important interventions to the environment without the
appropriate inspection of impacts and taking, in some of them, to social spatial segregation of the urban space (for the construction related to the World Cup and the Olympics) and even the rural space with
the impact and displacement imposed to traditional groups and communities (such as in Belo Monte and the transposition of São Francisco River).159
Nevertheless, successes have been reported. Deforestation has
reduced by seventy percent between information dated 2013 and the
average between 1996 and 2005 with the use of measures such as the
creation of new protected areas in the Amazon. These measures include native reserves and sustainable use units, and the approval of
the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal
Amazonia, besides the work of control bodies, especially the Public
Prosecutors’ Office.160
V. Conclusion
With the trend to treat the environment at the level of human
and constitutional rights, it would be fair to think that the protection
157. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA (IBGE), PERFIL
DOS MUNICÍPIOS BRASILEIROS 2012 [PROFILE OF BRAZILIAN
MUNICIPALITIES 2012] (2013).
158. Id.
159. Rodrigo M. Vilani & Carlos José S. Machado, Justiça social e ambiental: reflexão sobre os megaeventos esportivos no Rio de Janeiro [social and environmental justice :
reflection on the mega sports events in Rio de Janeiro], 5(3) SUSTENTABILIDADE EM
DEBATE 245 (2014).
160. Doug Boucher et al., Report: Deforestation Success Stories. Tropical Nations Where
Forest Protection and Reforestation Policies Have Worked, 24-25 (2014),
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/def
orestation-success-stories-2014.pdf.
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of that good would be insured in the countries that thus consider it.
However, that is not true because in the globalized world, states cannot make environmental policy decisions without taking into account
international problems and contexts related to it. They consider the
effectiveness of the measures and also the impacts they are producing
in their territories. Against that background, we tried to analyze the
intentions of the United States and Brazil in the international promotion of the right to a healthy environment.
The performance of the United States for the international
promotion of a healthy environment is variable and, nowadays, it is
shy once its strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests mostly
guide it. Its protagonism within the United Nations in the 1970’s was
replaced by reactive attitudes. One example of that was not ratifying
several conventions, such as the 1989 Basel Convention on the Disposal of Hazardous Waste, the 1992 Biological Diversity Convention,
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and others already mentioned above.161
Where there are concerns in environmental law, there also
tends to be concerns with human rights generally. The United States
has been adding the promotion of human rights in general and the
quality of the environment in particular to its external politics speech.
However, there is an evident contradiction for not ratifying the InterAmerican Convention of Human Rights and the Rome Statute,
among others.162 But it is also clear that North American citizens are
getting involved in the defense of the environment with the moral
awareness of the environmental issues due to economic progress at
any price.

161. Noah M. Sachs, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Ratifying the Basel Convention on Transboundary Waste, CPR BLOG (May 1, 2012),
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GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 493, 493 (2002); China Calls on the U.S. to Join Kyoto Protocol, WORLDWATCH INST. (2013), http://www.worldwatch.org/node/144.
162. Dan Beeton, The Other Side of the IACHR Reform Debate, CEPR CTR. ECON. & POL’Y
RES. (Mar. 22, 2013), http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/the-other-side-of-theiachr-reform-debate; Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty, AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. (May 2002),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5361&context=faculty_sc
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The participation of Brazil to promote a healthy environment is
revealed regionally and nationally at a global level also as contradictory. Its external protagonism in the 1990’s was followed by more
careful and even reactive behavior. Then, internally, it contradicted
some international commitments and gradually reduced the levels of
environmental protection. The construction of the Belo Monte power
plant, the transposition of the S. Francisco River, and the organization of mega events such as the World Cup and the Olympics mobilized government forces to mitigate environmental standards.163 Economic and strategic reasons were behind that mitigation and even
disrespect to those already mitigated standards.
The United States, in the face of the reduction of tax barriers
on global trade after the Second World War, helped create the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which had no concern
about the environment at its basis.164 The decisions made, such as the
case of Mexico versus United States in 1991 regarding tuna sales and
dolphin protection, make the preference for the trade subject to clear
in negotiations between trade and environment.165
It was only with the World Trade Organization in 1995 that the
Committee for Trade and Environment was created to conciliate trade
and environment protection demands.166 However, even after eight
Ministerial Conferences for the members of the Organization, there
were no significant changes to the multilateral trade system regarding
the protection of the environment. Other negotiation rounds reproduced simple rhetoric claims for the promotion of world trade compatible with the requirements of sustainable development.
One can conclude that the international system for the protection of human rights has given a fragment treatment to the right to a
healthy environment, making it difficult to frame it as a kind of human right and, even more important, to make it effective. Also within

163. WORLD REPORT 2013, supra note 134, at 207 (2013); What Are the Challenges?, U.S.
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the WTO, the submission of the right to a healthy environment to the
orders of economic logic is recurrent.
It is more than time for economic issues to be solved jointly
with environmental issues once they are the two sides of the same
coin. International law for human rights has to take over the task to
define the content and the structure of the right to a healthy environment and reinforce its institutionalism by establishing mechanisms to
hold accountable those people, groups, or even states that start environmental crises. The WTO has to take the environmental issue seriously when negotiating, adjusting it to stimulate international trade.
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